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Res Judicata Effect of United States 
International Trade Commission Patent Decisions 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation, 1 a 
federal district court refused to give preclusive effect to an In-
ternational Trade Commission (ITC) patent decision, even 
though the patent issue had been fully and fairly litigated in 
the ITC.2 The Convertible Rowing decision represents the cur-
rent majority rule which, in effect, promotes great waste of 
judicial and individual resources. Because the federal courts do 
not give preclusive effect to ITC decisions on patent issues, 
parties can use the system to fully litigate a single issue in two 
different forums in either subsequent or simultaneous actions. 
First, complainants can use an ITC unfair trade proceeding 
( 1337 proceeding) as a mere "test run" against alleged patent 
infringers.3 For example, if a complainant loses in the ITC 
proceeding, the complainant may appeal that decision to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. If the complainant 
loses on appeal, he or she may subsequently file the same suit 
in federal district court and ask the court to litigate the patent 
issues de novo. 4 The expectation that ITC decisions will not 
have preclusive effect in the district courts, coupled with the 
usual speed of unfair trade actions in the ITC, make the lTC a 
very attractive forum for complainants.5 
Alternatively, the complainant could proceed simultaneous-
ly in the lTC and in a federal district court with both decisions 
being appealable to the Federal Circuit. The weight of dual-
system litigation could be totally devastating to an economical-
ly weak respondent. 
1. 721 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1989), affd, 90a F.2d 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
2. Id. 
:3. See Lupo, Dual-Path Litigation Before the International Trade Commission 
and the Federal Courts in Import Cases Involving U.S. Patents, 22 PAT. L. ANN. 
411 (Hll'4). 
4. 2H U.S.C. § 1:ml (1988). 
5. See Lever, Tlnfair Methods of Competition in Import Trade: Actions Before 
the International Trade Commission, 41 Bus. LAW. 1165, 1167 (1986) (discussing 
the aspects of ITC unfair trade actions which appeal to complainants). 
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Respondents can also use the system to their advantage. A 
respondent losing in the lTC proceeding can file suit in a feder-
al district court to relitigate the patent issues and obtain a writ 
staying enforcement of the lTC order against him.6 Using this 
procedure, an economically strong respondent may prevail over 
an economically weak complainant by drawing the weak com-
plainant into protracted litigation that he or she simply cannot 
afford. 
Failure to accord lTC decisions preclusive effect in patent 
matters promotes waste of judicial resources and of litigants' 
resources. The Federal Circuit has recognized this potential 
waste, stating that "the evils of vexatious litigation and waste 
of resources are no less serious because the second proceeding 
is before an administrative tribunal."7 Fortunately, several 
remedies are available which eliminate this waste while main-
taining judicial integrity in final decisions. 
This comment examines the consequences of the current 
lack of preclusive effect which federal courts give to lTC patent 
decisions. Section II explores the legal background from which 
this rule has evolved. Section III discusses an example of one 
case in which lack of preclusive effect has had a detrimental 
effect. Section IV analyzes the doctrines of claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion as applied to questions of patent validity in 
the federal courts. The analysis focuses on arguments both 
favoring and disfavoring preclusion. This comment concludes 
that the federal courts' refusal to afford preclusive effect to lTC 
patent decisions results in a waste of resources. It also recom-
mends specific options available to the federal government to 
effectively solve the dual-path problem. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Dual-Path Jurisdictional Considerations 
The reason for dual-path litigation between the lTC and 
the district courts is the overlapping jurisdiction which Con-
gress has granted to these two forums. In stating the problem, 
the Fourth Circuit said, "In short, the Congress has created 
two separate jurisdictions: One with jurisdiction over 'unfair 
acts' in connection with the importation of articles from abroad 
(the Commission), and the other with jurisdiction over the 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988). 
7. Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. ITC, 721 F.2d l30fi, 181fi (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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validity of domestic patents (the district court)."8 Because a 
determination of "unfair acts" in importation often requires a 
finding on the validity of a patent, both the ITC and the dis-
trict courts, in effect, have original jurisdiction over patent 
issues. Original jurisdiction is simply a tribunal's power "to 
take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it, and pass 
judgment upon the law and facts."9 
Without original jurisdiction, a tribunal cannot act on the 
merits of a matter at its inception; original jurisdiction, howev-
er, does not imply exclusive jurisdiction. Rather, exclusive juris-
diction means that a given tribunal is the only tribunal that 
can decide a particular type of issue. 10 
1. Jurisdiction in the ITC 
The ITC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over mat-
ters of unfair importation of articles. 11 In particular, in a 1337 
proceeding the ITC has the power to exclude products from 
entry into the United States if importing those products consti-
tutes "unfair acts in the importation of articles."12 The patent 
laws do not include the right to prevent violators from import-
ing infringing articles. 13 Thus, neither federal nor state courts 
have the power to prohibit importation of goods that infringe 
valid U.S. patents. 
Today, the ITC's original jurisdiction over unfair importa-
tion includes jurisdiction over patent infringement and validity 
issuesY However, until 1974, the ITC lacked original jurisdic-
tion to consider the validity of patents before it. The Trade 
Reform Act of 1974 expressly changed this by authorizing the 
ITC to consider "all legal and equitable defenses" brought be-
fore itY Thus, under the Trade Reform Act of 1974, the inval-
R. Ashlow, Ltd. v. Morgan Constr. Co., 672 F.2d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 1982). 
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (6th ed. 1990). 
10. !d. at 564. 
11. Ashlow, 672 F.2d at 375. 
12. Id. at 372. 
13. See ::l5 U.S.C. § 271 (1988). 
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988). 
15. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2054 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 
(1988) (citation omitted)), provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Unlawful activities; covered industries; definitions 
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the following are unlawful, and when 
found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any 
other provision of law, as provided in this section: 
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idity of a patent may be plead as a defense to an unfair trade 
action in the lTC. 
Moreover, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988 again dramatically enlarged the ITC's original jurisdic-
tion.16 Therein, Congress amended 19 U.S.C. § 1337 to elimi-
nate the required showing of injury in cases based on infringe-
ment of certain valid and enforceable intellectual property 
rightsY Between 1974 and 1988, validity and enforceability 
could be raised only in response to a complaint. Mter 1988, 
complainants were required to plead patent infringement as an 
element of the cause of action in the complaint. 18 
(B)The importation into the United States, the sale for im-
portation, or the sale within the United States after importation by 
the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that--
(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States 
patent or a valid and enforceable United States copyright 
registered under title 17; or 
(ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined under, 
or by means of, a process covered by the claims of a valid 
and enforceable United States patent. 
(C)The importation into the United States, the sale for im-
portation, or the sale within the United States after importation by 
the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that infringe a valid 
and enforceable United States trademark registered under the 
Trademark Act of 1946. 
(2) Subparagraphs (B) [and] (C) . . . of paragraph (1) apply only if 
an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the 
patent, copyright, trademark or mask work concerned, exists or is in the 
process of being established. 
(c) Determinations; review 
The Commission shall determine, with respect to each investigation 
conducted by it under this section, whether or not there is a violation of 
this section, except that the Commission may, by issuing a consent order 
or on the basis of a settlement agreement, terminate any such investiga-
tion, in whole or in part, without making such a determination. Each 
determination under subsection (d) or (e) of this section shall be made on 
the record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with 
provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 title 5. All legal and equitable 
defenses may be presented in all cases. Any person adversely affected by 
a final determination of the Commission under subsection (d), (e), (0 or 
(g) of this section may appeal such determination, within 60 days after 
the determination becomes final, to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit for review in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5. 
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988). 
17. ld. The added section makes "unlawful" the "importation" of articles that 
"infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent." ld. 
18. Id. 
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2. Jurisdiction in the district courts 
The federal district courts are given original jurisdiction for 
the protection of intellectual property rights in 28 U.S.C. § 
1338. 19 The district courts' power over patents is also exclu-
sive but in a very limited sense. Section 1338's grant of juris-
diction over patent actions specifically excludes state courts, 
but state courts may still hear and decide patent issues neces-
sary to state court causes of action. 20 While the district court 
is the only court in which a party may bring an action based on 
federal patent statutes, actions based on license contracts or 
state antitrust statutes which involve patent issues do not fall 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court.21 Thus, a 
state court adjudicating a license contract action may adjudi-
cate patent issues that are necessary to resolve the case, using 
Federal Circuit precedent as guidance.22 Most importantly, 
section 1338 does not preclude the ITC or any other admin-
istrative body from adjudicating patent issues linked to other 
issues before them. 23 
B. Doctrines of Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion 
Whereas jurisdictional statutes mandate the forum in 
which actions may be brought, claim and issue preclusion pre-
vent an action from being brought more than once. Claim pre-
19. Section 1338 provides: 
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety 
protection, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive 
of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copy-
right cases. 
(b) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substan-
tial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection 
or trade-mark laws. 
(c) Subsections (a) and (b) apply to exclusive rights in mask works 
under chapter 9 of title 17 to the same extent as such subsections apply 
to copyrights. 
20. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 804 F.2d 129 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Oximetrix, Inc., 
748 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Beghin-Say Int'l, Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen, 733 
F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
21. See cases cited supra note 20. 
22. Speedco, Inc. v. Estes, 853 F.2d 909, 914 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
23. 28 u.s.c. § 1338 (1988). 
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elusion, also referred to as res judicata, bars a complainant 
from raising a claim again if two parties have fully litigated a 
particular "claim" resulting in a final judgment.24 However, 
claim preclusion bars only further adjudication of claims which 
have been fully adjudicated on the merits. 25 
Issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, bars 
the relitigation of issues actually litigated in a prior action.26 
Issue preclusion applies only to issues that are: (1) identical; 
(2) actually litigated in the prior action; and (3) essential to the 
final judgment of the prior action. Additionally, the plaintiff 
must have had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the 
issue in the first action.27 In this comment, the effect of both 
claim and issue preclusion is referred to as preclusive effect. 
C. Preclusive Effect of Federal Agency Decisions 
Federal agency decisions are normally given preclusive 
effect.28 The law is well established that when an administra-
tive agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disput-
ed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had 
an adequate opportunity to litigate, the resulting decision 
should be given preclusive effect in the district courts.29 Thus, 
it logically follows that when the ITC, a federal administrative 
agency, acts in a judicial capacity, the resulting decisions 
should be given preclusive effect in the district courts. But they 
are not. 
24. RE&'TATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18-19 (1982). A claim is equiva-
lent to a plaintiffs cause of action. If a plaintiff sues on any part of his claim, he 
is precluded from further litigation on that claim. 
25. RE&'TATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(2) (1982). Full adjudication on 
the merits does not include dismissal without prejudice. 
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
27. RE&'TATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982). See also Blonder-Tongue 
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323 (1971). 
28. See, e.g., United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) 
(when an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disput-
ed issues of fact properly before it in which parties have had adequate opportunity 
to litigate, courts may apply res judicata to enforce repose); Stillians v. Iowa, 843 
F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1988) (a discharge claim under Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act can be precluded by prior unreviewed state administrative decision if the 
decision is a result of a fair hearing before the administrative agency acting in a 
judicial capacity); Union Mfg. Co. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 
1985) (the court gave ITC trademark decisions preclusive effect); Baltimore Luggage 
Co. v. Sarnsonite Corp., 727 F. Supp. 202 (D. Md. 1989) (the district court held 
that ITC decisions on trademark issues are res judicata in the district courts if the 
litigants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the ITC). 
29. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). 
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D. Current State of the Law 
In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illi-
nois Foundation, 30 the Supreme Court held that once a patent 
has been held invalid, the patent owner is thereafter precluded 
from relitigating the validity of the patent so long as the patent 
owner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior 
proceeding.31 Blonder-Tongue has been applied to decisions 
rendered in most administrative forums which were subse-
quently taken to federal court.32 However, ITC decisions on 
patent issues are an anomalous exception to this general rule, 
because Blonder-Tongue has not been conclusively held applica-
ble to these decisions. It seems logical that since ITC unfair 
trade proceedings provide the parties with a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate patent issues, ITC judgments should be given 
preclusive effect. Accordingly, there exists some authority 
holding that ITC decisions on patent issues should be given 
preclusive effect.33 
However, the Federal Circuit has heard the issue of preclu-
sive effect based only on a cursory analysis of the Trade Reform 
Act of 1974.34 Without clear direction from the Federal Cir-
cuit, the majority of district courts, following Convertible Row-
ing,35 have not granted preclusion to ITC patent decisions, 
despite ample reasons favoring preclusion.36 
:;o. 402 U.S. 31:; (1971). 
81. 402 U.S. at 850. 
82. See cases cited supra note 28. 
a:;. Dudley Shearing Mach. Mfg. Co. v. LaBounty Mfg. Co., No. C-C-86-295-M 
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 1988). A district court order approved preclusive effect of lTC 
patent decisions in the district courts in is an unreported case. 
:34. See. e.g., Texas Instruments v. lTC, 851 F.2d 342 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Tandon 
Corp. v. lTC, 831 F.2d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (appellate treatment of decisions of 
the Commission does not estop fresh consideration by other tribunals); Corning 
Glass Works v. lTC, 799 F.2d 1559, 1570 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Lannom Mfg. Co. 
v. lTC, 799 F.2d 1572, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (the lTC did not have jurisdiction 
to unilaterally determine validity, absent the presentment of such a defense by a 
party). 
35. 721 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1989), a(fd, 903 F.2d 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, ??? U.S. ??? (1990). 
36. Madsen, Federal Practice and Procedure, 1989, A.B.A. SECTION PATENT, 
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW REPORT 190. 
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III. In Re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation 
A. Background 
In October 1984, Diversified Products Corporation (DP) 
and Brown Fitzpatrick Lloyd, Ltd. (BFL) filed a patent in-
fringement action against Weslo, Inc. (Weslo) in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah.37 This action 
was consolidated with nine other similar actions and trans-
ferred to the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware.38 All the actions asserted patent infringement, un-
der 35 U.S.C. § 271, of U.S. Patent No. 4,477,071 for a "Con-
vertible Rowing Exercising Apparatus" (the '071 patent).39 
Almost simultaneously with the district court actions, DP 
filed a complaint with the lTC against Weslo, pursuant to 19 
U.S.C. § 1337.40 The lTC conducted a formal investigation of 
DP's allegations that Weslo was committing acts of unfair trade 
practice in violation of section 1337 by importing goods which 
infringed the '071 patent. Weslo defended on the grounds that 
the '071 patent was invalid and not infringed.41 After exten-
sive discovery, the lTC held a ten-day trial, resulting in an 
initial determination entered by the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ). The ALJ found that the '071 patent was "anticipated" 
and "obvious" and therefor invalid.42 
The full lTC reviewed the initial determination and re-
versed the ALJ's conclusion of anticipation but sustained the 
ALJ in his determination that Weslo had not violated section 
1337 on the ground that the '071 patent was obviousY DP 
thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit, which affirmed the lTC decision that the '071 patent was 
37. Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 597. 
3R. ld. 
39. Id. 
40. !d. at 597-98. 
41. "Weslo, Inc. was the only defendant common to the District Court action 
and the ITC proceeding and was the only active participating defendant before the 
ITC." Id. at 598 (emphasis added). 
42. "Anticipated" means that the item was not novel or different from other 
exercise machines. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). "Obvious" means it was enough like 
other exercise machines that it was an obvious application of the technol~gy. 3fi 
U.S.C. § 103 (1988). All additional defenses raised by the defendant were disal-
lowed so that the only basis for the ALJ's decision and the subsequent ITC deci-
sion was invalidity of the '071 patent. 721 F. Supp. at 598. 
43. Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 598. 
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invalid.44 
While the ITC case proceeded, the consolidated cases in 
Delaware were stayed by stipulation. Mter losing in the ITC 
and Federal Circuit, DP turned again to the civil suits consoli-
dated in Delaware, seeking to relitigate the very same issue 
that had been decided against it: the validity of the '071 pat-
ent.45 
On January 27, 1988, Weslo filed a motion for summary 
judgment in the Delaware district court seeking dismissal on 
grounds of issue and claim preclusion.46 In response, the court 
considered whether the district court's original jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) totally precluded the application of 
the issue and claim preclusion doctrines.47 
The Delaware district court entered an order denying sum-
mary judgment and certified its order for immediate appeal, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).48 The Federal Circuit de-
clined to hear the appeal and denied rehearing of that deci-
sion.49 The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari.50 
B. The District Court's Reasoning 
The main issue before the district court was whether an 
ITC determination concerning patent validity, affirmed by the 
Federal Circuit, should be given preclusive effect in a district 
court.51 Dealing with this issue, the court discussed three ar-
guments favoring preclusive effect, and then three arguments 
disfavoring preclusive effect. Finally, the court concluded that 
preclusive effect was improper. This holding was based on the 
legislative history of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 and on the court's per-
ception that the form and substance of patent issues in the ITC 
44. !d. 
45. !d. at 596-60::l. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
1990). 
I d. 
!d. 
!d. at 604. 
In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 903 F.2d 822 (Fed. Cir. 
50. Weslo, Inc. v. Diversified Prods. Corp., 111 S. Ct. 248 (1990). 
51. "The question . . . [was] one of first impression because of the relatively 
recent passage of the Federal Court Improvements Act of 19R2. Previously, deci-
sions of federal District Courts on patent matters were appealed to the Court of 
Appeals in the Circuit of that District Court. Decisions of the ITC were appealed 
to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA). Now decisions 
of District Courts on patent questions and all decisions of the ITC are appealed to 
the Federal Circuit." Convertible Rowin,R. 721 F. Supp. at 597 (citations omitted). 
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and the district courts are different, and, therefore, a patent 
decision by the ITC should not be preclusive in a district 
court. 52 
1. The district court's analysis favoring preclusive effect 
First, the court considered the rule promulgated in Blond-
er-Tongue that once the owner of a patent has had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the validity of a patent, that owner 
is precluded from relitigating the validity of the patent.53 The 
court stated that complainants had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the patent before the ITC because the procedural 
and substantive aspects of the proceeding were adequate. Also, 
the court noted that complainants chose to pursue their relief 
in the ITC.54 
Second, the court discussed the doctrine of "administrative 
res judicata,"55 which requires an administrative agency to act 
in a judicial capacity when making the decision at issue. 56 The 
court stated that the ITC has acted in a judicial capacity when 
it considered the validity of the patent in accordance with this 
requirement. 57 
Third, the court noted the practical problems that would 
occur if preclusive effect were not afforded to the ITC decision. 
If preclusive effect were not granted, the district court could 
find the patent to be valid. This would mean that the district 
court would be in direct disagreement with the Federal 
Circuit's prior decision, and the Federal Circuit then would 
likely have to consider the same issue on appeal for a second 
time.58 Additionally, the court noted that those persons who 
had relied upon the Federal Circuit's affirmance of the ITC 
decision could face severe financial harm.59 
52. ld. 
5:3. ld. at 600. 
54. Id. 
55. This doctrine was established in United States v. Utah Construction & 
Mining Co., :384 U.S. :394 (1966). 
56. ld. 
57. Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 600. 
5R. ld. at 599. 
59. The court gave the example of persons who, attempting to produce a prod-
uct for market, might invest capital in reliance on a determination by the ITC and 
an affirmance by the Federal Circuit. ld. 
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2. The district court's analysis disfavoring preclusive effect 
The court used jurisdiction as a means to justify denial of 
preclusive effect. First, the court considered the respective 
jurisdictional statutes which empowered the lTC and the dis-
trict court to hear this dispute.60 The court stated that Con-
gress placed original jurisdiction over patent questions in the 
federal district courts61 and original jurisdiction over unfair 
import trade practices exclusively in the ITC.62 The court 
went on to say that due to the separate jurisdiction of the two 
forums, the treatment of patent issues differs in both form and 
substance.63 In justifying this position, the court said that 
"Congress, in promulgating the jurisdictional parameters for 
the lTC and the federal District Courts, created two separate 
jurisdictions to consider two distinct questions: jurisdiction over 
unfair trade acts lies with the lTC while jurisdiction over the 
validity, enforceability and infringement of patents lies with 
the federal District Courts."64 
The court then noted that the Federal Circuit and other 
courts have considered this issue.65 These courts all cited spe-
cific language saying that lTC patent findings are "properly not 
accorded res judicata effect because the lTC has no jurisdiction 
to determine patent invalidity, except to the limited extent 
necessary to decide a case otherwise properly before it."66 The 
Federal Circuit has also stated that its appellate treatment of 
lTC determinations as to patent validity does not estop other 
tribunals from reconsidering the question of patent validity.67 
Finally, the court interpreted the legislative history of the 
Trade Reform Act of 1974 as expressly limiting lTC determina-
tions of patent questions since the federal district courts have 
original and exclusive jurisdiction over patent matters.68 
60. Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 600-02. 
61. 28 u.s.c. § 1338 (1988). 
62. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1332(b), 1337 (1988). 
63. Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 601. 
64. ld. 
65. See, e.g., Union Mfg. Co. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42, 45 (2d 
Cir. 19H5). 
66. Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 601. 
67. Tandon Corp. v. ITC, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
68. Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 602. 
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3. Rejection of the arguments for preclusive effect 
The court rejected the arguments favoring preclusive effect, 
stating that the issues litigated before the ITC and affirmed by 
the Federal Circuit were not the same issues that it would 
examine on the merits.69 Once again, the court cited jurisdic-
tion as a valid reason for denial of preclusive effect. The court 
stated that "the ITC only considered the patent issue to the 
extent it needed to exercise its jurisdiction under section 
[1]337", while "[t]he question on the merits . . . will involve 
solely an inquiry into patent issues under section 1338."70 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Given the current state of the law, patent issues decided in 
the ITC could be given preclusive effect in the federal district 
courts. There are at least three reasons supporting preclusive 
effect. First, the Supreme Court has said that decisions of ad-
ministrative agencies will be given preclusive effect when an 
agency is acting in a judicial capacity. 71 Second, the ITC cur-
rently has original jurisdiction to hear patent issues in unfair 
trade proceedings. 72 Third, the current rule forces parties to 
bear tremendous and unnecessary economic and administrative 
burdens. For example, in Convertible Rowing, the court forced 
Weslo to bear the burden of a second trial on the merits of the 
patent issue by not giving the ITC patent decision preclusive 
effect. Fairness dictates that one party should not be empow-
ered to force two complete judicial proceedings on another par-
ty en route to a final decision on a single issue. Better alterna-
tives exist that will allow both parties a full and fair opportuni-
ty to litigate their disputes before a competent tribunal. 
A. The Supreme Court's View of Collateral Estoppel and Res 
Judicata 
Refusal to grant preclusive effect to ITC patent decisions 
disregards the Supreme Court's prior decisions in Blonder-
69. ld. at 60:3. 
70. ld. 
71. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., :384 U.S. :394, 421 (1966). 
72. 19 u.s.c. § 13a7 (1988). 
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Tongue 73 and Utah Construction.74 In Blonder-Tongue, the 
Court established that once a patent has been held invalid, the 
patent owner is thereafter precluded from relitigating the va-
lidity of the patent so long as the patent owner had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding. 75 The 
Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue has been followed and cited 
extensively. 76 
In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.,77 the 
Court held that findings of federal agencies are to be given 
preclusive effect where the agency acted in a judicial capaci-
ty.78 The holdings from these cases argue strongly in favor of 
affording preclusive effect to ITC decisions in the federal dis-
trict courts. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has long embraced the 
judicial interests served by the doctrines of collateral estoppel 
and res judicata. These doctrines serve the "dual purpose of 
protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical 
issue with the same party . . . and of promoting judicial econo-
my."79 Both doctrines are "central to the purpose for which 
civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of 
disputes."80 
These doctrines also provide many practical benefits. The 
Court in Allen v. McCurry81 stated that the preclusion doc-
trines serve to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multi-
ple lawsuits ... by preventing inconsistent decisions [and] en-
courag[ing] reliance on adjudication."82 "Public policy dictates 
that there be an end of litigation ... where one voluntarily 
73. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
74. 384 u.s. 394 (1966). 
75. 402 U.S. at 350. 
76. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); MGA, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 
735 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1009 (1988); Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier 
Corp., 741i F.2d 651, 651i (Fed. Cir. 1984); Mississippi Chern. Corp. v. Swift Agric. 
Chems. Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1376-79 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
77. a84 U.S. at 421-22. 
78. Id. 
79. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. a22, 326 (1979) (party losing in 
SEC agency dispute estopped in later civil suit). 
80. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (citing Southern Pac. 
R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1879)) (the issue was the application 
of preclusion doctrines based on prior state court proceedings). 
81. 449 U.S. 90 (1980). 
82. ld. at 94. 
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appears ... and is fully heard."83 
In the Convertible Rowing case, the district court correctly 
found that DP had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
validity of the patent in the ITC hearing. Also, the court cor-
rectly found that the ITC was acting in a judicial capacity 
when it found the patent invalid.84 Additionally, the Federal 
Circuit, an article III court, affirmed the ITC decision. In fact, 
in Convertible Rowing, the district court determined that all 
but one of the requirements of Blonder-Tongue and Utah Con-
struction were fully satisfied.85 The district court held that 
Blonder-Tongue doctrine did not apply because the issues were 
not precisely identical.86 The court in Convertible Rowing in-
correctly justified its finding that the patent issues were not 
identical by focusing on the differences in the jurisdictional 
statutes goveming the ITC and the district courts. This com-
ment will show that the differing jurisdiction of the ITC and 
the district courts is no bar to granting preclusive effect to ITC 
patent decisions. 
Practical problems arise in the judiciary by not affording 
preclusive effect to ITC patent decisions. The court in Convert-
ible Rowing addressed the possibility that Weslo could be a 
victor in the ITC and a loser in the district court.87 The ab-
surd result of this would be a valid patent for some purposes 
and an invalid patent for others.88 By not according preclusive 
effect, the court imposed on Weslo the burden of another full 
trial on the merits of the patent issue with all the associated 
legal fees and costs. Moreover, parties like Weslo lose the bene-
fit of finality in litigation. For example, DP will be able to point 
to Weslo as an alleged infringer as a strategy to persuade cus-
tomers to refrain from dealing with Weslo.89 
B. District Courts Have Original Jurisdiction in Patent Ques-
tions 
Patent issues decided as part of ITC unfair trade proceed-
ings under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 are identical to patent issues de-
H:i. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 288 U.S. fi22, .52.5-26 (1981). 
84. Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 600. 
Hfi. ld. 
H6. ld. at 603. 
H7. ld. at fi98-99. 
88. ld. at .599. 
89. Finality in this context refers to ending the litigation after the parties have 
exhausted available appeals from an ITC decision. 
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cided under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 in the federal district courts. 
Congress placed original and exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
matters in the federal district courts. 90 On the other hand, 
original jurisdiction over unfair trade practices in import trade 
is vested exclusively in the ITC. 91 The district court in Con-
vertible Rowing concluded that a jurisdictional conflict exists 
between the jurisdictional statutes of the district courts and 
the ITC, making patent issues decided in these two forums 
somehow different issues.92 However, this conclusion is 
flawed, because the application of the doctrines of issue and 
claim preclusion will not transfer any additional jurisdictional 
authority to consider patent cases to the ITC. 
The case of Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating 
Corp. 93 shows how the district court's reliance on jurisdiction 
in limiting the effect of ITC patent decisions is unfounded. In 
Christianson, the trial court decided several patent issues while 
making a decision on antitrust claims. On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit decided that the Federal Circuit had exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the patent questions involved and thus transferred the 
case to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit disagreed. The 
Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit and held that 
the Federal Circuits's exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals 
did not bar other appellate tribunals from considering patent 
questions in resolving claims or cases properly before it.94 
Unlike the Convertible Rowing decision, the Christianson 
decision demonstrates that a tribunal can decide patent ques-
tions without intruding on the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Federal Circuit when resolving questions properly before it. It 
logically follows that application of the preclusion doctrines to 
patent questions decided en route to deciding an issue properly 
before the ITC does not transfer or undermine the patent juris-
diction of the district courts. Thus, the jurisdictional statute 
authorizing an action to be brought in a given forum has no 
bearing on whether a patent is valid and enforceable. 
C. Legislative History of the Trade Reform Act of 1974 
The Federal Circuit has asserted that an ITC determina-
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1838 (1988). 
91. 19 u.s.c. §§ 1832(b), 13:37 (1988). 
92. Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 601. 
93. 4R6 U.S. 800 (19R8). 
94. !d. 
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tion of patent validity "does not estop fresh consideration by 
other tribunals.'>95 Since the Trade Reform Act of 1974 con-
tains no language which speaks to the preclusive effect of ITC 
decisions, this assertion was based on a single statement in the 
legislative history of the Trade Reform Act of 1974.96 The 
statement is contained in a portion of a Senate Finance Com-
mittee Report: 
The Commission's findings neither purport to be, nor can they 
be, regarded as binding interpretations of the U.S. patent 
laws in particular factual contexts. Therefore, it seems clear 
that any disposition of a Commission action by a Federal 
Court should not have a res judicata or collateral estoppel 
effect in cases before such courts.97 
Courts relying on this statement fail to recognize that legisla-
tive history may become irrelevant when the legislation it re-
fers to is significantly modified by new legislation, as here. 98 
Thus, the above statement is simply not controlling due to 
recent legislative developments which have changed the juris-
diction of the ITC and the structure of the portion of federal 
court system which adjudicates patent issues. These significant 
changes will now be discussed in detail. 
The first of these changes occurred in 1974 with the pas-
sage of the Trade Reform Act. Prior to the Trade Reform Act of 
1974, the ITC did not have jurisdiction to determine the validi-
ty of patents. The 1974 Act changed the ITC's jurisdiction by 
95. Tandon Corp. v. ITC, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1987). However, this 
case does not refer to Blonder-Tongue, Utah Construction, or any other authority 
on the doctrine of issue or claim preclusion. 
96. This act modified 19 U.S.C. § 1337 to its present form. 
97. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 193, 196, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7186, 7329. Several Federal Circuit cases asserting 
that ITC patent determinations should not be given preclusive effect refer to this 
passage. The Federal Circuit in In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 
903 F.2d 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990), refused to hear Weslo's appeal on the issue of 
preclusion but stated that it had considered that question of law on four previous 
occasions. See cases cited supra at note :H. In Corning Glass Works v. ITC, 799 
F.2d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the court noted the existence of the argument 
hased on the passage. Also, in Union Mfg. Co. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 76:1 F.2d 
42 (2d Cir. 1985), the court gave ITC trademark decisions preclusive effect, com-
menting in dicta that patent decisions would not be given preclusive effect, based 
on the passage in the legislative history. 
98. Just as it is appropriate when construing a statute to consider circum-
stances when the statute is enacted, Callejas v. McMahon, 750 F.2d 729, 781 (9th 
Cir. 1984), a court must also consider significant changes that have occurred since 
that time. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 399 (1966). 
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authorizing the ITC to entertain "[a]ll legal and equitable de-
fenses" brought before it.99 The legislative history of the 1974 
amendment states that the ITC may and should, when present-
ed, review the validity and enforceability of patents. 100 
The second change was the creation of the Federal Circuit 
in 1982. 101 This changed the judicial review of ITC determi-
nations because the Federal Circuit was given exclusive jurisdic-
tion to hear appeals from ITC decisions 102 and appeals from 
all district courts in cases arising under the patent statute. 103 
Previously, such appeals went to the various Circuit Courts. 
The third change was the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988 which gave the ITC the power to decide 
patent issues as part of the cause of action presented. 104 This 
change, in effect, gave the ITC original jurisdiction to hear 
patent issues. Given these dramatic changes in circumstances 
since the 1974 amendment was enacted, the legislative history 
to that amendment is of little value in determining whether 
ITC decisions should be given preclusive effect. In 1974, Con-
gress was not aware that both ITC and district court decisions 
on patent validity would be reviewed by the same tribunal and 
that the ITC would be empowered to hear cases with patent 
issues plead in a cause of action. 
In light of these recent unforeseen circumstances, it is 
improper to give persuasive weight to only two sentences in the 
legislative history of a statute which does not expressly address 
the questions of issue and claim preclusion. It is particularly 
important not to give these sentences much weight since the 
Blonder-Tongue and Utah Construction decisions strongly sup-
port the application of issue and claim preclusion doctrines to 
ITC patent decisions. 105 The argument for giving ITC patent 
99. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1988). 
100. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 193, 196, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
CODE CoNn. & ADMIN. NEWS 7186, 7329. 
101. Prior to 1982, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) had 
jurisdiction to review ITC determinations. However, the CCPA did not have juris-
diction to hear appeals from district court decisions in patent cases. These deci-
sions were reviewed by each of the several circuit courts of appeals. SENATE COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL COURTS IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1982, S. REP. No. 275, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 11. 
102. 19 U.S.C. § 1:~37(c). 
103. 28 U.S.C. §§ 129fi(a), 1338(a) (1988). 
104. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). 
105. See also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. fi52, 566-68 (1988) (legislative 
history is not controlling); Burlington N.R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 
454, 461 (1987) (statutory language is conclusive). 
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decisions preclusive effect is bolstered by Congressional testi-
mony in conjunction with the passage of the Trade Reform Act 
of 1974. Testimony in the legislative history indicated that lTC 
patent findings could have the same influence that a state 
court's patent opinion on validity has in a federal court. 106 Al-
lowing preclusive effect for lTC patent decisions in federal 
courts is consistent with this testimony because state court 
decisions on patent validity are routinely given preclusive effect 
in the federal district courts. 107 
D. Possible Solutions 
The problems exemplified in the Convertible Rowing case 
could be solved in two ways. First, courts could give preclusive 
effect to judicially affirmed lTC patent-validity decisions. Alter-
natively, Congress could pass legislation to merge the ITC's 
jurisdiction over unfair importation actions with the district 
courts' jurisdiction over patent actions. 
1. Grant preclusive effect to ITC decisions on patent issues 
Under current jurisdictional statutes governing patent 
decisions, granting preclusive effect to lTC patent decisions 
would be appropriate. Moreover, giving these decisions preclu-
sive effect would alleviate judicial waste and the harms en-
countered by the parties as a result of litigating identical issues 
in multiple forums. 
While this solution is feasible and resolves the harm 
caused by dual-track litigation, the benefits of reducing multi-
ple litigation must be balanced against potential prejudicial 
effects. First, lTC proceedings are not formally governed by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 108 Second, the speed re-
quired of an lTC proceeding may preclude one of the parties 
106. In hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee, a witness gave 
a statement regarding patent validity decisions of the ITC, stating that "[a] Tariff 
Commission (ITC) report or finding on validity should have no more influence in a 
federal district court . . . than presently a state court's opinion on validity would 
have on a federal district court." Trade Reform: Hearings Before the Committee On 
Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R. 6767, The 
Trade Reform Act of 1973 1590 (1973). 
107. See, e.g., MGA, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 735 (Fed Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1009 (1988) (relitigation of the issue of patent in-
fringement is precluded by a prior state court judgment of noninfringement). 
108. However, the ITC's procedures are very similar to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The procedures are set forth in 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.1 to 210.71. 
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from having the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the 
issues. In fact, some commentators have argued that an lTC 
proceeding is not an even playing field and "stacks the deck" 
against the respondent. 109 If this is true, giving preclusive ef-
fect to lTC decisions would not be fair to the respondent, espe-
cially since the respondent does not choose the forum. 
In light of these concerns, another possible solution would 
be to give lTC decisions preclusive effect against the complain-
ant but not against the respondent. Precluding the complainant 
from dual-track litigation would greatly reduce the duplication 
of effort and waste because the complainant would be bound by 
his choice of forum. Also, permitting only one chance to raise 
the issue would dispose of the concept of a "test run" in the lTC 
and would thus force the complainant to choose carefully the 
forum for litigation. This approach would strike a better bal-
ance than currently exists regarding the potential risks facing 
complainants and respondents in lTC proceedings. 
2. Change the relationship between the ITC and the district 
courts 
International pressure may cause Congress to legislate a 
solution to the dual-track litigation problems caused by the 
overlapping jurisdiction of the lTC and the federal district 
courts. The fact that a complainant in a 1337 proceeding can 
bring proceedings in both the federal courts and the lTC im-
pacts the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The 
European Economic Community (EEC) has informed the con-
tracting parties to GATT that the overlapping jurisdiction be-
tween the lTC and the federal district courts causes waste and 
inconvenience. The EEC alleges that imported products, which 
are administered by section 1337 unfair trade proceedings, re-
ceive less favorable treatment than U.S. domestic products in 
domestic actions. Its complaint caused the GATT council to 
form a panel to consider the problem and its possible solutions. 
The panel has suggested several possible solutions, which in 
turn have been evaluated and adopted by the American Bar 
Association (ABA) Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright 
Law. 110 
109. Madsen, Federal Practice and Procedure, 1989, A.B.A. SECTION PATENT, 
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW REPORT 188, 194. See generally Lupo, supra note 
8. 
110. Bradley, GAIT Panel Report on Section 1.'3.'37, 1990, A.B.A. SECTION PATENT, 
146 B.Y. U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
The ABA Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law 
has selected three of the panel's options as being both respon-
sive to GATT requirements and consistent with the best inter-
ests of the United States patent and judicial systems. The 
three selected options include: ( 1) removal or transfer of section 
1337 unfair trade proceedings to a district court at respondent's 
option; (2) modification of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 so as to provide 
only preliminary (temporary) relief; and (3) modification of 
section 1337 so that counterclaims and damages may be deter-
mined by a district court. The ABA committee prefers option 
number three because it would address the deficiencies identi-
fied by the GATT panel while entailing minimal changes in the 
current lTC and district court systems. 111 
Option number one would also resolve the problem effi-
ciently because it would allow the respondent, who foresees a 
potential for multiple proceedings, to preempt this eventuality. 
A respondent would have the power to avoid the protracted 
litigation and the waste that now occurs. Thus, either party 
could avoid the harms of overlapping jurisdiction; the respon-
dent could remove the patent issues if he anticipated a harm, 
and the complainant could exercise his choice of forum at the 
inception of the litigation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The "test run" strategy currently used in the lTC results in 
great waste of judicial resources and imposes unreasonable 
burdens on the parties. The potential for harm demands that 
the courts or Congress take action to correct the currently defi-
cient rule of law. The courts could alleviate much of the prob-
lem by granting preclusive effect to judicially affirmed lTC 
decisions on patent matters. Granting such preclusive effect 
will lessen the burden on both the courts and litigants. Howev-
er, it may be international pressure that provides the impetus 
to Congress to take action and solve this anomaly in the United 
States court system. 
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW REPORT 285. 
111. ld. 
Hal D. Baird 
